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Film Review
The Thin Blue Line: Art or Trial in the
Fact-Finding Process?
By Bennett L. Gershmant
Prosecutors in Dallas have said for years, "Any prosecutor
can convict a guilty man; it takes a great prosecutor to convict an
innocent man."'
On November 28, 1976, about half-past midnight, on North
Hampton Road in Dallas, Texas, Police Officer Robert Wood
was shot to death at point blank range by the driver of a Mer-
cury Comet. The killer sped away leaving no clues. After a
month-long investigation, the police arrested Randall Dale
Adams and charged him with the murder. Adams, who had no
prior record, was tried, found guilty, and sentenced to death.'
Twelve years later, Adams' case is the subject of an ex-
traordinary film, The Thin Blue Line.3 Blending monologues,
restagings, old movie clips, visual artifacts, newspaper accounts,
maps, drawings, photographs, and police reports, the documen-
tary meticulously dissects what is known about the case and the
identity of the killer. In much the same manner that the
t Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. I would like to thank my col-
leagues, Professors Donald L. Doernberg, Lissa Griffin, M. Stuart Madden, and Barbara
Salken for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article. I am also grateful to
my secretary, Ms. Judith Caporale, for her assistance.
I would like to dedicate this Article to my late colleague and friend, Dean Philip B.
Blank.
1. Transcript, The Thin Blue Line (Third Floor Productions, Inc. 1988), at 40
[hereinafter Transcript] (defense attorney Melvyn Bruder).
2. State v. Adams, F-77-1286-I (Crim. Dist. Ct. No. 2 Dallas County), affd, 577
S.W.2d 717 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979), rev'd sub nom. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980),
on remand 624 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
3. Miramax Films (1988).
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Kennedy assassination still consumes us, the film projects a
quality of urgency that rivets our attention. A haunting, pul-
sating score accentuates the tension. We are drawn inexorably
into a psychological twilight zone of lies, deceptions, contradic-
tions, and mistakes. The result is a portrayal, more vivid than
any judicial decision or fictional account, of the vulnerability of
the adversarial process of criminal justice, and the ease with
which an innocent man could be put to death.
The film's central visual motif - which recurs again and
again with nightmarish intensity - shows Officer Wood ap-
proaching the side of the car he had stopped, apparently for fail-
ing to illuminate its headlights. The window rolls down, and five
gunshots explode into Wood's body and head. Who did it? Why?
Each time we view this macabre tableau we search the gray
shadows and blurred outlines for clues. In each revisitation,
however, the scene changes, reinvented and transformed in the
myriad ways that we, as well as police investigators and wit-
nesses, might imagine it could have occurred.
Through this kaleidoscope we are relentlessly exposed to
the formidable task facing trial juries, especially the jury which
decided Randall Adams' fate, of resolving the falsehoods, incon-
sistencies, and ambiguities inherent in discovering the truth
about a historical event. Ironically, however, we probably assimi-
late more relevant data in less than two hours than was im-
parted through the legal process to the Adams jury. Further,
through this cinematic art form, we very likely are better
equipped than the Adams jury to resolve the factual issues. It is
a profoundly depressing experience. Indeed, the film's account of
police myopia, judicial arrogance, witness corruption, and
prosecutorial misconduct, has provided the impetus, as well as
leads to actual evidence, for Adams' recent vindication.4
4. Apparently, Errol Morris, the director of the film, was given access to the prose-
cutor's files in the case that disclosed exculpatory information never revealed to Adams'
attorneys. Moreover, his interviews with witnesses produced statements that contra-
dicted their trial testimony. See Singer, Predilections, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 6, 1989, at
63; Applebaum, "Blue Line" Aftermath: New Trial for Convict, N. Y. Times, Dec. 8,
1988, at C19, col. 5. As this Article was being completed, a Texas judge, following an
evidentiary hearing on Adams' application for a writ of habeas corpus, granted the appli-
cation and recommended a new trial. Ex Parte Randall Dale Adams, No. W-77-1286-I(B)
(Crim. Dist. Ct. No. 2 Dallas County), afld, No. 70,787 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 1, 1989).
On March 21, 1989, Adams was released from jail and will not be retried. See infra note
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Part I of this Commentary objectively analyzes the film, fo-
cusing on its monologues, dramatizations, and exhibits. The
film's organizational structure roughly parallels the stages of the
criminal justice process, from the investigation and arrest of Ad-
ams to his trial, conviction, sentence, and post-conviction litiga-
tion. The prologue and epilogue unify the story. Part II attempts
to explain the bizarre judicial result, focusing on the prosecutor's
dominant role in the criminal justice process. It concludes, as
does the film, that one of the fundamental features of our legal
system - the intrinsic ability of the adversary process to dis-
cover the truth5 - cannot function when weighed down by
prosecutorial misconduct. Part III analyzes the film's epistemo-
logical conclusion that although ultimate truth is unknowable,
the artist's version of the truth can be superior to the official
version arrived at by law. Part IV offers a brief conclusion and
brings the case up-to-date.
I. Documentary Dramatization of a Murder Case
The film's prologue immediately introduces the overriding
conflict between Adams' version of the events and that of the
prosecution's chief witness, David Harris. Although legally re-
solved by the jury, it remains a mystery. It is immediately ap-
parent that either Adams or Harris killed Officer Wood. The
viewer's task, and the jury's as well, is straightforward: any
information which inculpates Harris necessarily exculpates
Adams, and vice versa.
Adams - the camera depicts a somber, expressionless man
in white prison attire - relates, almost in a monotone, how he
and his brother left Ohio in October, 1976, looking for work out
160 and accompanying text.
5. See generally J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL (1950); FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE
(1978); Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Pro-
cedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506 (1973); Frankel, The Search for
Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975); See also Tehan v. United
States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966) ("The basic purpose of a trial is the deter-
mination of truth"). But see Flannery, The Prosecutor's Case Against Liberal Discov-
ery, 33 F.R.D. 74 (1963) (trial not a search for truth).
For an interesting discussion of various theories of the American adversary system,
see Goodpaster, On The Theory of American Adversary Criminal Trial, 78 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 118 (1987).
1989]
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West. They arrived in Dallas on Thursday, November 25th,
where Adams immediately found employment. "Everything
clicked. It's as if I was meant to be here."" By contrast, David
Harris - the camera reveals a cordial, personable young man
in bright red attire - was a sixteen-year-old misfit with a long
juvenile record. Harris stated, "I took a pistol from my dad and
a shotgun - took a neighbor's car. I think I had broken into
their house or something and got the keys to it .... Ended up
coming to Dallas."7
The camera shifts back and forth between Adams and Har-
ris. Adams explains that his car ran out of gas on his way home
from work and "a person ... pulled over ... and asked me if I
needed any help." 8 Harris then describes how he picked up
Adams and drove him home. Their stories seem to mesh. They
agree that they spent the evening together drinking beer, smok-
ing marijuana, and going to the movies. What else did they do
together? When did they part? Why did they even meet? There
is an existential quality which Adams himself expresses: "Why
did I meet this kid? I don't know. Why did I run out of gas at
that time? I don't know. But it happened."9 The harrowing
dramatization of the killing - along with the flashing red light
atop the police car - suddenly interrupts this dialogue, con-
veying the stark realization that at least one other person knew
the killer's identity - Officer Wood.
The film, in the mode of a detective thriller, now moves to
the investigative phase. We learn that the police immediately fo-
cused their attention on the recollections of Police Officer
Teresa Turko, who was Wood's partner that night. Exactly what
Turko saw has always been a baffling question, vividly depicted
in the film. Turko, who is not interviewed in the film, was indis-
putably present when Wood was shot, and we see her in one
simulated variation of the motif emptying her service revolver at
the car as it sped away. However, although she consistently
maintained that there was only one occupant in the car, she
6. Transcript, supra note 1, at 1.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 2.
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could identify neither the car nor the killer.1" Turko was even
hypnotized, but this failed to produce any leads.11 A chocolate
milkshake she had been drinking, flying surreally in slow motion
from her hand into the roadway (she and Wood had just left a
fast-food restaurant) suggests, as depicted in another dramatiza-
tion of the motif, that she was seated inside her patrol car and
rushed out only after she heard the gunfire.
Monologues by Dallas homicide investigators record their
frustration:
It was getting awfully close to Christmas.
We still hadn't cleared it ... [.1 We'd never really gone that
long in Dallas without clearing the murder of a police officer.
We'd had several killed but we'd always cleared them pretty
quick. And this case had gone a month, or nearly a month, and
we still hadn't cleared it. However, we finally got the break that
cleared it. .. [.1
It came out of Vidor, Texas.
The film shifts to Vidor - a Texas road map helps locate the
town - and the film returns to David Harris.
Several of Harris' neighbors, enthusiastic participants, recall
10. Officer Turko gave several contradictory reports to the police after the killing.
She stated that she did not know the hair style of the driver, did not know whether the
driver was black or white, male or female, and could not see into the car because "the
window was too dirty to see through." Ex parte Randall Dale Adams, No. W-77-1286-
1(B) at 6 (Crim. Dist. Ct. No. 2 Dallas County), aff'd, No. 70,787 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar.
1, 1989). Several of these reports were never disclosed to Adams' attorneys, despite a
court order. Turko's refreshed and rehearsed trial testimony, at variance with her earlier
accounts, became crucial in convicting Adams. The prosecution's suppression of these
reports was one of the grounds upon which the district court granted the writ. See id. at
5-7.
11. Id. at 7. The prosecution did not notify Adams' defense attorneys of Turko's
hypnosis. It is not clear whether the hypnosis had any effect on Turko's testimony,
wherein she claimed for the first time that the driver had "bushy hair." Hypnosis did not
trigger her recollection that the driver had bushy hair. In fact, she never told anyone
that the driver had bushy hair until after she met with Assistant District Attorney
Douglas Mulder to prepare her trial testimony. Id.
The issue of hypnotically-refreshed testimony recently has become a prominent evi-
dentiary issue in criminal litigation. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987). The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals has held that hypnotically-enhanced testimony may be intro-
duced at trial only after a determination by the trial court, outside the jury's presence,
that the proponent established its trustworthiness by clear and convincing evidence. Zani
v. State, 758 S.W.2d 233, 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
12. Transcript, supra note 1, at 8.
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that shortly after the murder, Harris bragged to them about kill-
ing Wood. After a news broadcast about the case, for example,
Harris "started swearing up and down. He said, 'I swear to
God . . . I shot that fucking pig. . . . I'm the one that killed
him.',1 Harris even displayed to one of his neighbors the .22
caliber pistol he used, saying, "It's the one I shot him with, right
here."" Harris explained to his friends that after Wood pulled
him over and came up to the window, Harris "rolled down the
window and just pulled the gun up and - Pow! - shot
him."' 15 Harris "swore up and down" to others that he murdered
the officer, "trying to get anybody and everybody to listen to
him. ... "I We watch these interviews incredulously. Did Harris
really say those things? More importantly, was he telling the
truth?
Unconstrained by trial processes, the film attempts to travel
into the mind of David Harris, to unravel its secrets. One
method in this elusive quest, of course, is to record Harris him-
self. To be sure, Harris testified at Adams' trial and was cross-
examined, 17 but one of the principal issues in the recent litiga-
tion was the trial judge's limitation of the cross-examination."
Indeed, Harris' revelations in this film, as we later learn, differ
drastically from his trial testimony. Early in the film, for in-
stance, we discover that immediately after the killing, Harris re-
turned to Vidor and went on a crime spree.
Got back there, robbed an O'Bannion's 7-Eleven with a .22
rifle. Committed some other burglaries and what have you. All
this time I was on probation - juvenile probation. Eventually I
turned myself in for this stuff in Vidor. I think I made a confes-
13. Id. at 9 (statement of Hootie Nelson).
14. Id. at 10.
15. Id. at 9 (statement of Dennis Johnson).
16. Id. (statement of Floyd Jackson).
17. The importance of cross-examination to the fair and effective functioning of the
adversary process is well known. According to Wigmore, cross-examination "is beyond
any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth." 5 J. WIG-
MORE, EVIDENCE § 1367 (Chadbourne rev. ed. 1976). See also Alford v. United States, 282
U.S. 687, 692 (1931) (cross-examination is "one of the safeguards essential to a fair
trial"); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) ("Cross-examination is the principal
means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested").
18. Ex parte Randall Dale Adams, No. W-77-1286-I(B) at 3-4 (Crim. Dist. Ct. No. 2
Dallas County), a/I'd, No. 70,787 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 1, 1989).
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sion or something. I can't even remember exactly. So I'm told I
did.1 9
The trial judge refused to allow the jury to hear about these
crimes.20
We also hear from several of Harris' acquaintances. One
neighbor provides chilling insights into Harris' character:
I seen David up in the bushes [soon after the Wood murder].
"Say, David, what are you doing in the bushes?" And . . . "Oh,
man you ain't seen me." I said, "Why not? What's the deal?" He
said, "Man, you just ain't seen me. You ain't seen me. Forget
about seeing me, you know." Said, "Man, I've been having a real
good time. Been robbing these houses and held up a couple of
stores... [.1 Got me a pistol."
That completely just alienated him from the whole
neighborhood.
He didn't have a conscience. You know, if I do something
bad, you know, it kind of gets to me, I feel, you know, "Shucks, I
shouldn't have done that. I feel bad about it." Didn't bother him.
Didn't bother him at all.2 1
We further find out - a shattering discovery - that
Harris is presently on death-row in Texas for a subsequent mur-
der unrelated to the Wood killing, but strikingly similar in the
manner in which the victim was killed. A newspaper headline
and photographs of the victim accentuate the reality of that
event. Police tell us that Harris broke into a home where Mark
Mays and his girlfriend were alone. Harris forced Mays into the
19. Transcript, supra note 1, at 19 (statement of David Harris).
20. Adams v. State, 577 S.W.2d 717, 720-21 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that Adams' defense counsel had not properly preserved
the issue by failing to notify the trial court that he believed such proof was admissible to
demonstrate bias and motive on the part of Harris. The transcript of the trial proceed-
ings, however, reveals just the opposite, namely, that counsel repeatedly advised the
court that proof of Harris' pending charges of two burglaries and an aggravated robbery
was admissible to show bias and motive. Ex parte Randall Dale Adams, No. 70,787 at 3-4
(Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 1, 1989). After an evidentiary hearing on a federal writ of habeas
corpus, a magistrate found that the trial judge's ruling excluding proof of these crimes,
and the affirmance by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, were erroneous. The magis-
trate concluded that "the finding by the Court of Criminal Appeals to the effect that
counsel did not state that he wanted to demonstrate bias and motive on the part of
Harris is not supported by the record." Adams v. Lynaugh, Civ. No. CA 3-85-2448-G at 6
(N.D. Tex. filed May 13, 1988).
21. Transcript, supra note 1, at 20 (emphasis in original).
19891
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bathroom at gunpoint and abducted the woman. When Mays
chased after them, Harris shot him to death. A police officer de-
scribes the killing: "[W]hether it be two, three, or how many
shots, I don't know - [Harris] . .. fired at point blank or near
point-blank range."22
Sam Kittrell, a young police officer in Vidor who had several
encounters with Harris, is an important participant in the film.
Kittrell interweaves at various points to describe Harris' ongoing
criminal behavior and to provide eerie clues to Harris' personal-
ity. Kittrell recalls that a Mercury Comet had been stolen, and
Harris was seen abandoning the car and running away. Kittrell
at the time was hearing "little bits of information ... that David
had been involved in a shooting in Dallas of a police officer."23
I asked him about.., if he'd been to Dallas and he denied
having been to Dallas. I asked him if he'd been involved in any
type of shooting or knew anything about a shooting and he denied
that to the end, which is fairly consistent with David. Even if he
had of had some involvement, his first way that he always treats
you he would deny. Then if he felt as though you really knew that
he had done it, then he would be truthful about it."'
Harris told Kittrell where he could locate the murder weapon,
directing him to a swampy area behind Harris' residence.
Kittrell retrieved the gun which had been placed underwater in-
side a sock sprayed with boot oil to prevent rust.
Harris, whose gun was used to kill Wood, and who stole the
murder car, becomes a suspect and faces a wide assortment of
other serious criminal charges. He accuses Adams.2 5 Police de-
22. Id. at 45.
23. Id. at 8.
24. Id. at 9.
25. The district court found:
6. At the time of the interrogation, Harris was on juvenile probation for auto
theft and burglary. In early December 1976, he had been arrested and confessed to
three additional burglaries and an aggravated robbery.
7. During interrogation about the Wood murder, Harris inquired as to what
would happen to his pending charges if he had not killed Officer Wood but "knew
who did." He was advised that the resolution of those charges would depend on
the nature and extent of his cooperation in making a case against the perpetrator.
8. After receiving this information, Harris accused applicant of committing the
murder.
Ex parte Randall Dale Adams, No. W-77-1286-I(B) at 1-2 (Crim. Dist. Ct. No. 2 Dallas
[Vol. 9:275
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scriptions of their questioning of Harris are grimly humorous,
almost parody. Harris, according to the police, "came clean"
when he realized "they are going to send me to the penitentiary
for the rest of my life .... ",2 He told the police that he had
been "just bragging about this. I didn't do it, but I ... know who
did do it."'27 "[O]f course," recalled a detective, "he came clean
then. He tried to hide no facts. He just seemed like a friendly
kid. We didn't want to make him mad." 8 "It wasn't very long
until I realized that what he knew was the facts of the case and
it matched perfectly with what we knew. And it had to be
right."29
Harris wryly recounts the version he gave the police:
The story that I told, uh, was: we were ... it was like twelve
something, so it was the next day, uh, early in the morning.
We were stopped and, uh, when we were stopped, the officer
came up to the car and asked to see the driver's license or
whatever, and he [Adams] just started shooting.
I don't know why, but it's always seemed like time just
stopped or something, you know. I mean, it didn't seem like any
time passed, you know.
It just seemed like, like it was . . . Boom! Time stopped or
something. I don't know what it is, you know, uh. It's like a
flash.30
The film returns to Adams. The police arrested Adams on
the evening of December 21st. Etched from a distance, through
the window of an interrogation room in Dallas police headquar-
ters, is the profile of a young Randall Adams. The striking inno-
cence of the scene, strangely resembling an Edward Hopper
painting, contrasts sharply with the accumulating tension.
Adams recalls that a detective tried to force him to sign a con-
fession: "I told him I couldn't. . . . [He] threw a pistol on the
table. Asked me . .. to pick it up. I told him 'No'. . . . He
threatened me .... He pulled his service revolver on me. '
County), aff'd, No. 70,787 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 1, 1989).
26. Transcript, supra note 1, at 10.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 10-11 (statement of Marshall Touchton).
29. Id. at 11 (statement of Gus Rose).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 2-3.
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Statements by police personnel evoke laughter from some of
the audience: "I had what I call a casual, friendly conversation
with him to start with, to try to size him up . . . [aInd I found
almost immediately that he didn't have very much con-
science . . . . [H]e was the kind that didn't have a lot of re-
morse for what he had done." 2 "He showed no expression what-
soever." 3 "He, of course, almost overacted his innocence: he
protested he hadn't done anything, couldn't imagine why we
were bringing him in. He didn't fight or he didn't resist. He just
protested his innocence.'34
ADAMS:
"I kept telling them the same thing, the same thing, the
same thing. . . [.] They didn't want to believe me."35
Adams told the police that after riding around with Harris
they went to a drive-in movie, arriving around seven o'clock.
Fused with Adams' recollections are actual film clips from that
double feature, The Student Body and Swinging Cheerleaders.
The time these two films were shown and when the theater
closed became crucial issues at trial. A popcorn machine be-
comes a tell-tale marker, used to dramatize Harris' trial testi-
mony of when they left the movies: "Went to buy popcorn ... a
few minutes before midnight."36
ADAMS:
We watched half of the one show, we started watching the
first part of the second show.
32. Id. at 3 (statement of Gus Rose).
33. Id. (statement of Jackie Johnson).
34. Id. at 3 (statement of Gus Rose).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 42. This time sequence became crucial to corroborate Harris' testimony.
The defense called the theatre managers, who testified that " 'The Student Body' ran
from 7:00 p.m. until 8:25 p.m., 'The Swinging Cheerleaders' ran from 8:40 p.m. until
10:14 p.m., and 'The Student Body' ran again from 10:24 p.m. until 11:49 p.m. (Trial R.
111-614-15, 627)." Ex parte Randall Dale Adams, No. W-77-1286-I(B) at 16 (Crim. Dist.
Ct. No. 2 Dallas County), aff'd, No. 70,787 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 1, 1989). The prosecu-
tor knew from his investigator's written report that "'The Student Body' ended at 11:45
p.m. and there were no other showings that night." Id. at 17. Nevertheless, the prosecu-
tor not only suppressed this report about the movie times from the defense, but actually
vigorously cross-examined the managers in an effort to suggest that they may have
shown "Swinging Cheerleaders" a second time and that the theater may have remained
open for another hour. Id. at 16-17.
[Vol. 9:275
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I didn't really care for the second feature, which was an R-
rated, cheerleader type thing....
I told him I wanted to leave.
. .. [H]e's acting kind of strange because he wanted to watch
the end of the movie. Anyway, we left and we drove back towards
Dallas, and we drove to the motel.
... I told him that since he was looking for a job, and there
hadn't been anybody there at work, that if he wanted to stop
back Monday morning ... he can ride out and follow me to work,
dnd he can talk to the boss. And he would probably get a job.
I told him what time I went to work. And I left.
So I made me a sandwich and sat there and watched the end
of The Carol Burnett Show. And when it went off, the news came
on, and I watched fifteen, twenty minutes of the news. And that
was it. I turned the TV off and went to sleep. 7
As Adams talks, the camera scans a page from the local TV list-
ings for that date, showing that the Carol Burnett Show was on
until 10 p.m., after which the evening news came on.
The film shifts back to the interrogation of Adams. We see
close up an old typewriter, a clock on the wall, a document enti-
tled "Voluntary Statement," and an ashtray gradually filling
with cigarette butts. The police take a typewritten statement
from Adams. "I read through it, and when it was basically what
I liked, yes, I signed it." '3 8
Police officers state that:
[A]fter he made his right turn on Inwood Road . . .this is where
our statement ends. He says he does not remember anything after
that.
He didn't remember anything about a shooting. He didn't re-
member anything about a police officer stopping him or anything.
... [Tihat part of his mind just conveniently went blank.
... And that's just a convenient memory lapse, is all that is. 9
A newspaper reports that Adams "confessed."
Adams is now charged with capital murder and the case is
37. Transcript, supra note 1, at 13-15.
38. Id. at 15.
39. Id.
1989]
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scheduled for trial. Douglas Mulder will prosecute. The camera
slowly scans a list of Mulder's victories, including the names of
several defendants he sent to the electric chair. According to
Edith James, one of Adams' attorneys:
Douglas Mulder had a perfect win record. I believe he re-
signed from the D.A.'s office without any defeats ....
That's why he's legendary.
Everything, as I recall, that Mulder ever said was about what
a great guy Mulder was, how wonderful it was that he was getting
all these convictions.40
Judge Donald Metcalfe will preside. The camera closely
peers into his face as he speaks: "I grew up in a family where I
was taught a great respect for law enforcement. My father was
an F.B.I. man probably at the worst possible time to be in the
F.B.I. It was from 1932 to 1935 in Chicago. '41
Metcalfe is portrayed as a crime buff with evident sympathy
toward law enforcement. We watch a clip from an old movie
depicting John Dillinger's death, as Metcalfe recounts how his
father was at the Biograph Theater the night that Dillinger
was apprehended. Metcalfe describes the public's fascination
with Dillinger - "people were dipping their handkerchiefs
in [Dillinger's] blood to get souvenirs" - and the "trivia"
surrounding his capture - the "Woman in Red" that fingered
Dillinger "was really the Lady in Orange." '42
Adams describes the testimony of Harris and Turko. Harris
"was two hours late '43 in his account of the events that day.
Adams stated: "Everything that we did coincide with, he was
two hours late .... The police officer was killed at twelve thirty,
which is about two and a half hours after he last saw me." 44 Re-
ferring to Harris, Adams states:
His testimony is: as we were getting off the freeway on Inwood
Avenue, that we're pulled over, he gets scared and he slumps
down in the seat of the car. That as the officer walks up and
shines his flashlight and I roll down my window, I pull the pistol
40. Id. at 18.
41. Id. at 21.
42. Id. at 22.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 23.
[Vol. 9:275
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out and blow this man away.
His testimony is: that when I finally do drive to the motel, I
get out. I tell him, "Don't worry about it. Forget this ever
happened."
Now, that's crazy. That's crazy."'
Turko, according to Adams, gave an inconsistent account.
She told the police in her original statement, made fifteen min-
utes after the killing, that the killer wore "a fur-lined collar. '4
... In court: it might have been bushy hair. The kid [Harris]
testified that I had a Levi jacket on .... He testified at pre-trial
that he had a fur-lined parka.
She's telling you who killed the man. One person in the car
with the fur-lined collar.
Very convenient that the driver happened to have bushy
hair. All she's got to do is look at a picture they took of me. But
that is not her original statement. It's a hell of a big difference
from "a fur-lined collar" to "bushy hair. '4 7
Adams testified in his own behalf. His lawyers were "very
optimistic" about the result. Returning to the courtroom after a
recess, however, they saw three people standing in front of the
bench taking the oath to be sworn as witnesses. 8 A courtroom
artist's sketch depicts the scene. These three last-minute wit-
nesses were Emily Miller, her husband R.L. Miller, and Michael
Randell. 49 The most forceful witness was Emily Miller.
Mrs. Miller got on the stand that last afternoon. And she
said, "that's the man - I saw that man! I saw Randall Adams'
face just right after. . . " She said, "I saw the gun sticking out of
the car when he shot that police officer, and that's the man," and
she waved her finger right toward Randall Adams. She's the one
that got him convicted.50
The camera carefully surveys Emily Miller - dyed blond
45. Id. at 22-23.
46. Id. at 24.
47. Id. at 24-25 (statement of Randall Adams).
48. Id. at 25.
49. These "rebuttal" witnesses were not included on the prosecutor's list of wit-
nesses. Defense counsel did not learn of their existence until they testified. Ex parte
Randall Dale Adams, No. W-77-1286-I(B) at 21 (Crim. Dist. Ct. No. 2 Dallas County),
afj'd, No. 70,787 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 1, 1989).
50. Transcript, supra note 1, at 25 (statement of Adams' attorney, Edith James).
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hair, heavily made up, much older than she looked in newspaper
photographs taken during the trial. Her free-flowing monologue
has a stunning impact, contrasting sharply with the cramped
question and answer style of testimony. As she talks, the film
intermingles several clips from an old Boston Blackie movie:
EMILY MILLER:
Yeah, when I was a kid I used to want to be a detective all
the time because I used to watch all the detective shows on TV.
When I was a kid they used to show these movies with Bos-
ton Blackie and he always had a woman with him. And I wanted
to be the wife of a detective or be a detective, so I always watched
detective stories.
I'm always looking because I never know what might come
up. Or how I could help. I like to help in situations like that. I
really do.
It's always happening to me, everywhere I go, you know, lots
of times there's killings or anything, even around my house.
Wherever. And I'm always looking or getting involved, you know,
find out who did it, or what's going on.
I listen to people. And I'm always trying to decide who's lying
or who killed who before the police do. See if I can beat them.
Yeah. 1
The camera deftly alternates between Emily Miller and her
husband R.L. Miller as they describe what they claim they saw
that night.
EMILY MILLER:
See, I was working at a gas station.2 My husband and I both.
And then we weren't getting along well at all. So we was arguing
back and forth. And this was why we didn't want to go home be-
cause we would rather talk it out in the car than go home with
the kids and fight, you know? Had to listen to them, too. So we
were really arguing, and we decided to go get something to eat.
So about that time, a police came out of a restaurant on the
right hand side of the road and he went to pull the man over.
R.L. MILLER:
She turned around. I seen she was looking hard. She looked.
And I didn't think she seen the guy, but she did. Because I said,
51. Id. at 26.
52. In fact, as we later learn, Emily Miller was fired from her job two weeks earlier
for stealing from her boss.
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"What you looking at?" Because I knew something went wrong. I
said, "What you looking at?"
And she said, "You just shut up and drive."
EMILY MILLER:
And I kept telling my husband, "Slow down, slow down so I
can see." And he said, "No." He said, "Come on." He said,
"We're getting out of here. You're too nosy. You don't even know
what's going on."
R.L. MILLER:
I had no idea somebody was going to get killed or shot. So I
just drove on.
EMILY MILLER:
He was one of these kind that ... he didn't like getting in-
volved in nothing. He wanted to go on. He told me to shut up and
turn around, don't look. I turned around and looked anyway.
R.L. MILLER:
So we heard something like backfire, or firecrackers, or some-
thing. And so we drove over the bridge, and I got to thinking, I
said, "Emily, there're no firecrackers this time of the year."
I was thinking to myself, "that couldn't be somebody shoot-
ing," you know.
EMILY MILLER:
It was real dark, and it was cold. It was hard to see in that
car. But, see, his window was down. The driver's window was
down. And this is how I got such a good look.
R.L. MILLER:
I really didn't see anything inside. It was kind of. .. shadows
on the window and stuff. But when he rolled down the window
was what made his face stand out so .... The car was dark blue.
He had a beard, mustache, kind of dishwater-blond hair. But
like I say, when he was in court, he sure looked a lot different. All
I could tell was by this and this, you know, it was him.
I knew that there was some shots over there. I mean, you
know, but I didn't want to be involved in it, because West Dallas
is a high-crime neighborhood. One of the biggest.
EMILY MILLER:
He was more scared of it than I was. But see, when you have
black people like that, they don't like getting involved in nothing.
That's just common.
Like hearin', you know ... ? Nobody wants to see nothing or
hear nothing. And they'll stay completely in the background.
That's why they were having such a hard time over there finding
anybody that would come forward - because it was in a totally
black neighborhood.
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R.L. MILLER:
She just believed if she seen somebody doing something
wrong, she'd sure tell it. She told on me a couple of times. She
said that I was hauling drugs out of El Paso. Called the Sheriff
down there, going to make me open my trunk. So I ended up
opening it, but there wasn't nothing in it. Yeah, and . . . [.1 Oh,
man! Eeeooowww. Yeah, if she found out you done something, she
sure turn you in.53
With this lengthy dialogue as a backdrop, the film reveals
information about the Millers that was not disclosed to defense
counsel during the trial. The Millers apparently were engaged in
a violent weekend-long argument and were arrested for disor-
derly and violent behavior, at which point they decided to be-
come prosecution witnesses."' Emily Miller admits that she
53. Id. at 26-28.
54. See Ex parte Randall Dale Adams, No. W-77-1286-I(B) at 8. On December 3,
1976, Emily Miller gave a statement to the police in which she described the driver as
" 'either a Mexican or a very light skinned black man.'" Id. at 9. Adams is a white man.
Prior to trial the court ordered the prosecutor to provide the defense with any informa-
tion favorable to the defendant or inconsistent with the prosecution's theory of guilt.
The prosecutor, according to the district court on Adams' application for a writ of
habeas corpus, "knowingly suppressed Mrs. Miller's written statement." Id. "During de-
liberations, the jury sent out a note asking for Mrs. Miller's initial description of the
driver to the police. The trial court refused this request. (Trial R. V. - 1313-15)." Appli-
cation for writ of Habeas Corpus Ex parte Randall Dale Adams, No. W-77-1286-1(B) at
7-11. The prosecutor subsequently testified at a federal evidentiary hearing that he
should have disclosed the statement to the defense but "forgot" to do so. See Adams v.
Lynaugh, Civ. No. CA 3-85-2448-G at 8 (N.D. Tex. filed May 13, 1988).
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had initially ruled on this issue on the direct
appeal. The court determined that defense counsel did not request Emily Miller's state-
ment until three days after she testified. "This was not a timely request, and appellant
may not complain of the failure of the prosecutor to disclose the statement earlier."
Adams v. State, 577 S.W.2d 717, 723 (Tex. Crim, App. 1979).
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals apparently misread the record. A federal mag-
istrate, after an evidentiary hearing, held
that finding is clearly not supported by the record .... It is, thus, manifest from
the state record that defense counsel made the proper motion for production of
Miller's statement and that such motion was granted by the trial court. The con-
trary finding by the Court of Criminal Appeals is not supported by the record and
is not entitled to be presumed correct by this Court.
Adams, Civ. No. CA. 3-85-2448-G at 8.
The district judge, ruling on Adams' application for a writ of habeas corpus, made
these additional findings:
16. On Monday, May 2, 1977, defense counsel reiterated his request that the State
produce any prior written statements made by Mrs. Miller.
17. Mr. Mulder then provided Mrs. Miller's written statement.
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viewed a line-up in which Adams was present. She identified
someone other than Adams - "I didn't pick him out right
then, because I picked out this bushy-haired man" 55 - after
18. Applicant sought to reopen the testimony to recall Mrs. Miller for further
cross-examination.
19. Mr. Mulder advised the court that Mrs. Miller had already left for Bellville,
Illinois, and that he had went to her apartment that morning and determined that
she had moved out (Trial R. V-1147, 1150-51).
20. In the alternative, applicant offered Mrs. Miller's written statement for im-
peachment so the jury would have the benefit of her initial description (Trial R.
V-1148, 1157-58).
21. Mr. Mulder opposed the offer, contending that although it was not unfair to
the State, it was unfair to Mrs. Miller to admit her written statement without
giving her a chance to explain (Trial R. V-1160).
22. The court excluded the statement, observing that if Mrs. Miller was still in
Dallas, the court "absolutely" would allow applicant to recall her (Trial R. V-
1166).
23. In fact, Mrs. Miller was in Dallas at the Alamo Plaza Motel on Monday, May
2, 1977.
24. The Dallas County District Attorney's Office had been paying the Millers' ho-
tel bill at the Adolphus Hotel through Friday, April 29, 1977.
25. When Mrs. Miller completed her testimony, she told Mr. Mulder that she
would be at the Alamo Plaza Motel if he needed her any further (Fed. R. 1-125).
26. Mr. Mulder's statement to the court that Mrs. Miller was en route to Bellville,
Illinois, was incorrect.
27. The State's knowledge that Mrs. Miller was at the Alamo Plaza Motel was
corroborated, to some extent, by the presence of her motel phone bill in the
State's file, with notations made on that bill by Mr. Mulder. Mr. Mulder was una-
ble to explain at the evidentiary hearing why he had Mrs. Miller's bill from the
Alamo Plaza Motel in his file and why he had made notations regarding the num-
ber of phone calls made from her room.
28. During deliberations, the jury sent out notes asking for Mrs. Miller's initial
description of the driver to the police and inquiring whether Mrs: Miller had iden-
tified applicant in a police lineup.
29. The jury was extremely concerned about Mrs. Miller's identification testi-
mony, but expressed no such concern with the less compelling testimony of Robert
Miller and Michael Randell.
30. This issue was properly preserved for review when the court granted, prior to
trial, applicant's Gaskin and Brady motions.
31. No appellate court has ever fully considered the merits of this issue.
32. Suppression of this statement was harmful to applicant, as it could have been
used to impeach Mrs. Miller's harmful testimony identifying him as the driver.
33. The State's suppression of this statement undermines the court's confidence
in the jury verdict.
34. The court recommends that habeas corpus relief be granted.
Ex parte Randall Dale Adams, No. W-77-1286-I(B) at 10-11.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals specifically affirmed these findings. Ex parte
Randall Dale Adams, No. 70,787 at 9-12 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 1, 1989).
55. Transcript, supra note 1, at 44.
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which a police officer told her that Adams was the murder sus-
pect." R.L. Miller viewed the same line-up and did not pick out
Adams because "he didn't get that good a look at him."57 The
film discloses a very large reward offered in the Wood
case - neatly portrayed by newspaper clippings - and sug-
gests that this reward inspired the Millers to point out Adams.
We learn also that Emily Miller's daughter was about to stand
trial on armed robbery charges carrying a maximum penalty of
life imprisonment, but that one week after Emily Miller testified
in the Adams case, the robbery charges against her daughter
were dropped. 8
56. The district court found that "the State knowingly used perjured testimony...
in eliciting [Emily Miller's] testimony that she had identified [Adams] in a police
lineup." Ex parte Randall Dale Adams, No. W-77-1286-I(B) at 12-13.
This finding was based upon the following:
1. At trial, Emily Miller testified outside the presence of a jury that in December
1976, she identified applicant in a police lineup (Trial R. IV-1080-81).
2. In response to questions from the court, she testified that the police did not
suggest which person in the lineup she should identify and that she identified
applicant on her own (Trial R. IV-1088-89).
3. The trial court found that her trial identification was not tainted by an unduly
suggestive lineup (Trial R. IV-1097).
4. During deliberations, the jury sent out notes inquiring whether Mrs. Miller had
identified applicant in a police lineup (Trial R. V-1320-21).
5. In fact, Mrs. Miller identified someone other than applicant in the police
lineup.
6. Mrs. Miller asked the officer conducting the lineup whether she had identified
the "right man."
7. The officer told Mrs. Miller that she had identified the "wrong man."
8. Mrs. Miller asked the officer which person was the "right man."
9. The officer pointed out applicant, by place in the lineup, as the murder suspect.
12. The State suppressed evidence that Mrs. Miller failed to identify applicant in
a police lineup, after which an officer improperly advised her that applicant was
the murder suspect.
Ex parte Randall Dale Adams, No. W-77-1286-I(B) at 11-12.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals specifically affirmed these findings. Ex parte
Randall Dale Adams, No. 70,787 at 11-12.
57. Ex parte Randall Dale Adams, No. 70,787 at 12. The prosecutor also suppressed
information contained in his files that R.L. Miller failed to pick Adams out of a line-up.
Id.
58. The dismissal of the robbery charges was initiated by Mulder, who advised his
co-prosecutor at the Adams trial to "check out" the robbery case against Miller's daugh-
ter. The case was dismissed the following day. The attorney representing Miller's daugh-
ter was not even aware of the dismissal. The existence of the pending charges against
Miller's daughter was never disclosed to the defense, even though the existence of such
charges motivated the Millers to testify for the prosecution. Ex parte Randall Dale
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The film portrays the Millers as self-motivated, irresponsi-
ble, and corrupt witnesses, whose last-minute testimony was
given too late to permit the defense attorneys to investigate
their stories. Elba Carr, a fellow employee of the Millers at Fas
Gas, reinforces these impressions. Emily Miller, according to
Carr, "had never told the truth in her life."5 9
[R.L. Miller] came to work the day after. He got to telling me
about the policeman that had gotten shot the night before. And I
hadn't heard anything about it. And I thought'it was another one
of these stories . . . And he brings in these newspapers, and he
says: he didn't see a damn thing. He couldn't see nothing, it was
too dark.
Wheels started rolling in his head about money, you know.
And that's when he got the idea . . . Let me put it in his
words: for enough money, he would testify to what they wanted
him to say. He would say anything that they wanted him to say.
Or he would see anything that they wanted [him] to see.
Those were his words.
I was shocked that he did go ahead and get up and tell that
he saw the actual shooting and ... you know, recognized the boy.
Identified him.6 0
Carr tried to alert the defense to these facts but was too late."
The third last-minute witness was Michael Randell. He tells
us that he has "develop[ed] something like total recall. '6 2 There
were two individuals in the car, according to Randell, and the
driver had long blond hair and a moustache. His recollection
contradicts his claim to "total recall."
The officer, he walked up to the vehicle. He had walked up.
His car was ... let me see ... I don't know if it was behind or in
front, but I know he had him pulled over, and he was up to the
car. I think he was up to the car. Let me think. Yeah, he was up
to the car. He had to have been up to the car. He was up to the
car.
I didn't see no bullet. I didn't see no gunfire. Because I went
Adams, No. W-77-1286-I(B) at 13-15.
59. Transcript, supra note 1, at 29.
60. Id. at 29-30 (statement of Elba Carr).
61. The film reproduces close up the contemporaneous telephone messages from Ms.
Carr to the defense attorneys reporting that the Millers were "telling lies."
62. Transcript, supra note 1, at 30.
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on.
63
Randell testified that on the night of the offense he had
been playing basketball at a nearby local court until midnight,
and that he was alone in his car. These statements, Randell ad-
mits, were untrue. In fact, the local basketball court closed at 5
p.m., and Randell had been cheating on his wife with a woman
named Debbie at the "Plush Pub" in Fort Worth." Debbie was
with him in the car at the time. 5 Randell is much more candid
on camera than he was in his sworn testimony at the trial.
I didn't tell them about that. I couldn't tell them. My wife'd kill
me. My wife would've tore my head off if she'd knowed I was out
that night with another woman.... I was trying to get her home.
The driver's side was down because the lady was a little sick.
You see, she needed some air, because she was pretty drunk."
Closing arguments by the defense and prosecution conclude
the trial. Mulder's summation, Judge Metcalfe recalls, was
highly emotional:
I always try very hard - every judge I know of does - to
not show emotion on the bench. The reason: if you do show emo-
tion, the jury might take it that you're favoring one side or an-
other. So you try to remain passive, emotionless, objective.
I do have to admit that in the Adams case - and I've never
really said this before - Doug Mulder's final argument was one
I'd never heard before: about the "thin blue line" of police that
separates the public from anarchy. And I have to concede that my
eyes kind of welled up when I heard that. It did get to me emo-
tionally, but I don't think I showed it. 7
We are slapped with the newspaper headline: "Adams Guilty."
The film shifts to the punishment phase of the trial. In
Texas, the jury decides whether a defendant convicted of capital
63. Id. at 31 (statement of Michael Randell).
64. Ex parte Randall Dale Adams, No. W-77-1286-I(B) at 15 (Crim. Dist. Ct. No. 2
Dallas County), afl'd, No. 70,787 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 1, 1989).
65. Randell testified at trial that he formerly played professional basketball with the
Denver Rockets, that on the night of the offense he had been playing basketball at a
nearby local court until midnight, and that he was alone in his car. This testimony, ac-
cording to the district judge, was perjurious. Id. at 15-16.
66. Transcript, supra note 1, at 42.
67. Id. at 31.
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murder should be executed. The jury's decision depends on
whether it finds that the defendant presents a future danger to
society."' To help the jury answer this question, the prosecutor
routinely elicits psychiatric testimony about the defendant's po-
tential dangerousness. One of the most controversial of these
psychiatric witnesses is Dr. James P. Grigson, known as "Dr.
Doom" or "Dr. Death." 9
ADAMS:
It was April 15th, tax day. I think I was filling out my taxes
at the time. Afraid I might be late. A guard walks up to the door
and tells me there's someone out here who wants to talk to you. I
asked him who it was. He said, he didn't know, but the court or-
dered me to talk to him. I said, "Oh, all right."
68. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon 1989). The statute provides:
(a) Upon a finding that the defendant is guilty of a capital offense, the court shall
conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant
shall be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. The proceeding shall be con-
ducted in the trial court before the trial jury as soon as practicable. In the pro-
ceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems rele-
vant to sentence. This subsection shall not be construed to authorize the
introduction of any evidence secured in violation of the Constitution of the United
States or of the State of Texas. The state and the defendant or his counsel shall
be permitted to present argument for or against sentence of death.
(b) On conclusion of the presentation of the evidence, the court shall submit the
following . . . issues to the jury:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased
was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of
the deceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts
of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society....
69. Dr. Grigson's testimony in capital murder trials has attracted considerable at-
tention. He has been labeled "Dr. Death." West Fifty Seventh Street (CBS television
broadcast, Oct. 15, 1988); Cope, Predicting Future Violence, TRIAL 82 (Feb. 1982) ("He's
the killer shrink") (quoting Henry Schwartzchild, Director of the Capital Punishment
Project of the American Civil Liberties Union); Merton, Confidentiality and the "Dan-
gerous" Patient: Implications of Tarasoff for Psychiatrists and Lawyers, 31 EMORY L.J.
263, 287 (1982) ("Dr. Grigson apparently has yet to meet a defendant he does not think
dangerous' "); The New Yorker, Sept. 5, 1988 at 76. He also has been referred to as "Dr.
Doom." Pike, "Doctor of Doom" Testimony Rejected: Death Sentence Vacated in
Texas," NAT'L L.J. June 1, 1981, at 5, col. 2; Tybor, Dallas Doctor of Doom, NAT'L L.J.,
Nov. 24, 1980, at 1, col. 2. He has been called the "hanging psychiatrist." J. WINSCADE
AND J. Ross, THE INSANITY PLEA 167 (1983). Dr. Grigson's testimony also has been the
subject of three Supreme Court decisions: Satterwhite v. Texas, 108 S. Ct. 1792 (1988);
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981). See Davis,
Texas Capital Sentencing Procedures: The Role of the Jury and the Restraining Hand
of the Expert, 69 J. CR. L. & CRIM. 300 (1978).
19891
21
PACE LAW REVIEW
And here come this real tall, ostrich-looking dude. [A photo-
graph depicts a smiling Grigson sprawled out on a sofa].
He introduced himself as Dr. Grigson. He pulled a pad out of
his coat pocket that had a line drawn across it. On this pad, on
the upper half he had six images. I will say a box, a square, a
circle with a diamond in it. I don't know - you know, it's been
awhile. He slides this piece of paper across to me and he hands
me a pencil. He says, "I'm going to get a cup of coffee. Please
copy what's on this piece of paper."
Well, I'm looking at this man, I said, "What? You want it
copied just the same way you did? Or you want me to change it
around? What do you want me to do?" He said, "[J]ust do
whatever you think you want to do," and he left. So on the bot-
tom half of this piece of paper I made my boxes and x's and zeros
with diamonds in them exactly like his. [A photograph of a
Bender-Gestalt test flashes on the screen].
He asked me, "What's the meaning of a rolling stone gathers
no moss?" I'm looking at this man and I'm saying, "Are you kid-
ding, is this a joke? What are you doing?" He said, "No, I really
want to know your answer to that question." I said, "Well, a roll-
ing stone gathers no moss, to me it would represent a person that
doesn't stand still long enough. It's kind of hard for people to
cling to him, he keeps moving on. It's hard for people to get close
to him."
He shook his head. He said, "What about, a bird in the hand
is worth two in the bush?" I said, "If you have a hold of some-
thing why give it up for the chance of getting something that
might be a little better? It doesn't make sense. You have got
something pretty good why let go of it? If you can get the other
one, get it if you can, but don't let go of what you got to try to get
something else.["]
He asked about my family. He asked about my background,
and he left. Total time we had talked: maybe fifteen, twenty
minutes.7
We are hit with another newspaper headline: "No remorse
. . . no guilt."
Adams recalls Grigson's characterizations:
He called me Charlie Manson. He called me Adolf Hitler. He
said I'm the type of personality that can work all day and creep
all night.
70. Transcript, supra note 1, at 32-33.
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... Even though he talked to me for fifteen minutes. I have
no prior ... arrest[s]....
He's crazy. He's crazy."1
Judge Metcalfe remarks:
You can understand why a man might steal if he needs
money to... put food on the table. I can understand why a sev-
enteen year old boy who doesn't have a car would steal one to
ride around in. I can understand why the heroin addict needs her-
oin. But it's very hard to understand why anybody has to kill a
police officer. It just doesn't have to be.71
A newspaper headline seals the result: "Adams Given Death."
Adams reflects on his death sentence as the film scans a
stark black and white photograph of an electric chair:
They're very serious. They're talking about how they're going
to execute you. Plain and simple. We're going to end it right here.
You get numb. You get numb. You get... [i]t's like a bad dream.
You want to wake up but you can't do it.
Fifteen times, twenty times a day I hear this same story
about what happens when a man is electrocuted. His eyeballs pop
out. His fingernails pop out. His toenails pop out. He bleeds out
of every orifice he's got."
Harris, in turn, reflects on Adams' fate: "I didn't have any
idea of what happened to him. After I testified, I was gone.
I never really concerned myself with it, you [k]now. Maybe I
didn't want to know. I didn't have any interest in knowing, oth-
erwise I might have tried to find out.
74
The post-trial proceedings are quickly condensed. Adams
lost his appeal in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. 5 One
week before his execution, the United States Supreme Court
granted him a stay, and a year later vacated his death
sentence."
71. Id. at 34.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 35.
74. Id. at 36.
75. Adams v. State, 577 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
76. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 50-51 (1980). The Supreme Court held that the
Texas statute in effect at Adams' trial relating to the qualifications of persons to serve on
capital juries violated the sixth and fourteenth amendments as construed in
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). The Court in Adams found that under the
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Judge Metcalfe's view of the appellate process suggests ei-
ther naivete or arrogance:
Our highest state appellate court - the Court of Criminal
Appeals in Austin - affirmed the case 9-0. And then it was re-
versed by the United States Supreme Court, 8-1.
When the Appellate Court reverses a case, they are never
saying the trial judge was right or wrong. They are saying they
disagree with the judge. You can't, for instance, in the Adams ap-
peals say the appellate courts were saying I was right or I was
wrong.
After all if in Austin, in our state appeals court, I was 9-0
correct and in Washington I was 1-8 incorrect. If you tally all
those votes I come out 10-8."7
Adams sought a new trial but his request was suspiciously
rejected. The prosecutor's office, according to Adams' lawyer,
vowed a retrial of Randall Dale Adams because there was no
room ... for a cop-killer going free, or getting off with anything
less than the death penalty....
... For reasons that were never really made public, [the pros-
ecutor] requested the governor to commute Mr. Adams' death
penalty to life and that eliminated the possibility of a retrial
based on the reversal."8
Texas statute, a prospective juror automatically was excluded from service if that juror
was unwilling to swear that the mandatory penalty of death or life imprisonment would
not affect his or her deliberations on any factual issue. Such inquiry resulting in exclu-
sion from service was much broader than Witherspoon permitted. Adams, 448 U.S. at
50-51. The appropriate standard is not whether the juror might in any way be affected
by the imposition of the death penalty, but rather, whether the juror would be unable to
follow the judge's instructions or obey his or her oath as juror. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at
522.
77. Transcript, supra note 1, at 38-39.
78. Id. at 39. See Adams v. State, 624 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) wherein
the court, by a vote of 6-3, denied Adams' application for a new trial following the Su-
preme Court's decision setting aside his death sentence. The majority's brief opinion
held that the Supreme Court decision had no direct effect on the as yet unaltered judg-
ment of guilt against Adams found in the trial court. Id. at 569. Moreover, the majority
concluded, since the Governor commuted the death penalty, there was no judgment re-
maining upon which the state court could act. Id. Three judges vigorously dissented,
urging that the Governor's action constituted a usurpation by the executive branch of
the judiciary's constitutional power. Id. at 569-70 (Clinton, J., dissenting). The dissenters
pointed out that on the date the Governor commuted the death sentence, in view of the
Supreme Court's decision, there was no valid judgment in existence assessing the punish-
ment at death, and therefore nothing for the Governor to commute. Id. at 570. The dis-
sent implied that the commutation was a sham to prevent Adams from obtaining a new
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The film ends by focusing once more on David Harris. Al-
though Sam Kittrell could not recall any specific factor in
Harris' background that would suggest violent or pathological
behavior, he mentions, almost in passing, that David "had one
brother that drowned, numerous years ago."7 9 We are suddenly
hit with the realization that this event is a clue to unraveling the
mystery. As Harris speaks, we see family album photographs of
Harris, his father and mother, and his younger brother. The ef-
fect is poignant, suggesting the seeds of Harris' criminal
personality.
I was three years old - I had a four year old brother and he
drowned, in 1963, right after President Kennedy was assassi-
nated, I believe - sometime right after that during the summer.
We was living in Beaumont on Harrison Street and, my dad was
working on his truck out in the yard and mom was in the house
doing her housework or fixing dinner or something.
Me and my brother, we had one of these blow up pools and
we were playing in that. My dad was supposed to be watching us
or keeping eyes on us or something. My brother wandered off,
down the street, and these people had a swimming pool in their
backyard, and they were elderly people, and they never used the
pool. I guess it had a bunch of leaves and stuff in it. And he,
evidently, fell in there and drowned.
I guess that was a great loss for me. I used to sit up in my
room at night and talk to him and he wasn't even there. So I
guess that might have been some kind of a traumatic experience
for me, you [k]now, at that time - not really understanding
what it was but having that loss.
I guess my dad always kind of felt responsible because, he
was supposed to have been there watching us. And I don't know,
maybe he couldn't get rid of the responsibility or the guilt or
something.
I don't know what it was. But I was there and I guess maybe
I reminded him of that. All the time growing up it was hard for
me to get any acceptance from him with anything I did. It was
never good enough. And when my brother, my younger brother,
trial. Id. at 569-70. The Executive Order stated that the Governor's commutation was at
the request of the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles. Id. at 570. But as the dissent
noted, Adams never requested a commutation of his sentence or a pardon. Adams
wanted a new trial. Id. at 570 n.6.
79. Transcript, supra note 1, at 47.
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was born it was kind of like he was daddy's favorite. Or some-
thing. I don't know. He realizes it now - how he treated me
then and I know he regrets it. And he thinks maybe that that's
what caused everything, but, I can't let him take that blame be-
cause everybody's life is going to take some kind of path regard-
less of what happens.
I think maybe a lot of the things I did when I was younger
was an attempt to get back at him or something for the way he
treated me. But I came to realize I wasn't doing nothing but hurt-
ing myself."
The film concludes with "the last interview" of David
Harris, on December 5, 1986. We do not see Harris. We see a
tape recorder in motion upon which is superimposed a transcript
of that last interview:
ERROL MORRIS:
Would you say that Adams is a pretty unlucky fellow?
DAVID HARRIS:
Definitely. If it wasn't for bad luck, he wouldn't have had
none.
ERROL MORRIS:
What was the bad luck?
DAVID HARRIS:
Could have been any number of things. Depends on how you
want to look at it. It's like I told you a while ago about the guy
who didn't have no place to stay. If he had a place to stay, he'd
never have nowhere to go, right?
ERROL MORRIS:
You mean if he would have stayed there at the motel that
night this would never have happened?
DAVID HARRIS:
Good possibility. Good possibility. Heard of the proverbial
scapegoat? There's probably been thousands of innocent people
convicted and there will probably be thousands more. Why? Who
knows.
ERROL MORRIS:
Is he innocent?
DAVID HARRIS:
Did you ask him?
ERROL MORRIS:
80. Id. at 48-49 (statement of David Harris).
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Well, he's always said he's been innocent.
DAVID HARRIS:
There you go. Didn't believe him, huh? Criminals always lie.
ERROL MORRIS:
Well, what do you think about whether or not he's innocent?
DAVID HARRIS:
I'm sure he is.
ERROL MORRIS:
How can you be sure?
DAVID HARRIS:
Because I'm the one that knows.
ERROL MORRIS:
Were you surprised that the police blamed him?
DAVID HARRIS:
They didn't blame him. I did. A scared sixteen year old kid.
He sure would like to get out of it if he can.
ERROL MORRIS:
Do you think they believed you?
DAVID HARRIS:
No doubt. Must have. They didn't have nothing else until I
give them something, so ... I guess they get something, they run
with it, you know.
ERROL MORRIS:
Were you surprised they believed you?
DAVID HARRIS:
I might have been. I don't know. I was hoping they'd believe
me. After all was said and done it was kind of unbelievable. But
there it is. I've always thought if you could say why there's a rea-
son that Randall Adams is in jail, it might be because the fact
that he didn't have no place for somebody to stay that helped
him that night ... landed him where he's at ....
That might be the reason. That might be the only, total rea-
son why he's where he's at today."'
A close up of the red flashing police car light signals the
film's end."2
81. Id. at 49-50.
82. After The Thin Blue Line was produced, Harris made further and even more
incriminating admissions. The district court found:
10. Harris admitted to Steve Dunleavy of the FOX Television Network, David
Pasztor of the Dallas Times Herald and David* Jackson of the Dallas Morning
News that he was alone in the car at the time of the Wood murder, that he was
holding the murder weapon in his right hand, that he stuck the gun outside the
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II. The Prosecutor's Control Over the Adversarial System
and the "Search for Truth"
By providing a devastating account of an almost certain
miscarriage of justice, The Thin Blue Line offers an enormously
compelling critique of the utility and fairness of the adversary
trial process. The problem is not unfamiliar. Many of the con-
cerns about the legal fact-finding system have been raised in
other contexts,8" but never in such a clear and direct way. To be
sure, some limitations upon accurate fact-finding derive from
constitutional and evidentiary rules .8  But the greatest threat to
reliable fact-finding emanates from the prosecutor's unique and
decisive role in the adversary system, and his ability to control
the adjudication process. Indeed, the most serious malfunctions
of the fact-finding process in Adams were attributable to the
prosecutor's willful suppression of evidence.
The prosecutor is commonly regarded as the most dominant
figure in the criminal justice system.85 The prosecutor decides
driver's window as Officer Wood approached, that his finger was on the trigger,
that the gun discharged five times, that Officer Wood fell to the ground and that
Harris drove away.
11. Harris sent a confidential letter to his mother in September 1988 acknowledg-
ing that he, rather than applicant, was responsible for the Wood murder and ex-
plaining reasons that he had not accepted responsibility when interrogated by the
police in 1976.
12. David Harris judicially confessed at the habeas corpus hearing that he, rather
than applicant, killed Officer Wood.
13. The only time that Harris has denied killing Officer Wood was when the police
confronted him with his admissions to friends and his possession of the murder
weapon, at which time he shifted the blame to applicant and later repeated that
version at trial.
Ex parte Randall Dale Adams, No. W-77-1286-I(B) at 2 (Crim. Dist. Ct. No. 2 Dallas
County), afJ'd, No. 70,787 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 1, 1989).
83. See supra note 5.
84. The exclusionary rules of the fourth and fifth amendments often keep out relia-
ble proof. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (fourth amendment); Jackson v. Denno, 378
U.S. 368 (1964) (fifth amendment). Rules of privilege also deny proof to the fact-finder.
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (privilege against self-incrimination); Trammel
v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980) (spousal privilege).
85. See Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521,
1555 (1981) (prosecutor holds the power to invoke or deny punishment); Young v. United
States ex rel. Vuitton et fils S.A., 107 S. Ct. 2124, 2141 (1987) ("Between the private life
of the citizen and the public glare of criminal accusation stands the prosecutor. That
state official has the power to employ the full machinery of the state in scrutinizing any
given individual.") See also B. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 4.1 (1985).
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whether or not to bring criminal charges, who to charge, what
charges to bring, and whether a defendant will stand trial, plead
guilty, or be granted immunity from prosecution. In jurisdictions
that authorize capital punishment, the prosecutor literally de-
cides who shall live and who shall die."6 Why did the prosecutor
proceed against Randall Adams at all? And with such vigor?
Why did the prosecutor not proceed against David Harris, who
more probably committed the murder?
The prosecutor knew from the outset that the killer more
closely resembled Harris than Adams,87 that the car had been
stolen by Harris,88 that the murder weapon had been stolen by
Harris, and that Harris was on juvenile probation when Wood
stopped the car.8 9 If he were caught with a stolen car or a
weapon, Harris would have been returned to prison as a proba-
tion violator. Harris went into hiding after the killing, thereafter
returning to Vidor and committing additional violent crimes.
Harris bragged to friends immediately after the killing that he
had murdered Wood.90 The theater manager contradicted
Harris' account of the time when Harris left the movies that
night.91 The three last-minute identification witnesses either
failed to identify Adams in a line-up, gave inaccurate descrip-
tions to the police, lied about their backgrounds, or had motives
to fabricate their stories.2 By contrast, the prosecutor knew that
86. Moreover, in exercising this vast power, the prosecutor is independent from the
judiciary, and his discretion is virtually unlimited. The prosecutor can neither be com-
pelled to prosecute, see United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
Cox v. Hauberg, 381 U.S. 935 (1965); Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v.
Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 381 (2d Cir. 1973), nor can he be enjoined from prosecuting,
United States v. Thompson, 251 U.S. 407, 411-13 (1920). Although some prosecutorial
discretion is necessary, the exercise of such discretion can be "lawless," H. PACKER, THE
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 290 (1963); "tyrannical," see Henderson v. United
States, 349 F.2d 712, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (Bazelon, C. J., dissenting), and "dangerous,"
Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CR. L. & CRIM. 3, 5 (1940).
87. Turko's initial description, although vague, stated that the driver wore a "dark
coat with a large collar" and had "collar length hair." Exhibit A-1, Ex parte Randall
Dale Adams, No. W-77-1286-I(B) (Crim. Dist. No. 2 Dallas County), aff'd, No. 70,787
(Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 1, 1989). She did not say until the trial that the driver had
"bushy hair." Ex parte Randall Dale Adams, No. W-77-1286-I(B) at 6.
88. Transcript, supra note 1, at 35.
89. Id. at 19.
90. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 36.
92. See supra notes 54-56.
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Adams had no criminal record, had been honorably discharged
from the Army, had always held a steady job, had gone to work
every day at his job in Dallas even after Wood was killed, had no
history to even remotely suggest he would commit such a crime,
and had no reason to kill the policeman. 3
Yet, Adams was an easy target. Harris provided eyewitness
testimony,94 the Millers and Randell supplied corroboration,95
and Adams himself made a statement which, although ambigu-
ous, could have suggested that he knew more than he was say-
ing.96 Admittedly, even an ethical prosecutor faces considerable
pressure to proceed aggressively against a suspect such as
Adams. Once a case acquires this kind of momentum, it becomes
difficult - perhaps even institutionally impossible - for any
prosecutor to analyze that case objectively and decide to forego
or defer prosecution. 7 Such institutional pressures are even
more compelling in an unsolved murder of a police officer, and
raise complex ethical and legal questions. Thus, although a pros-
ecutor is obligated to ensure generally that justice is served, and
to protect a defendant's right to a fair trial, he is also en-
couraged to win.9 8 The pressures that impel a prosecutor to
prosecute aggressively and make winning so attractive can result
in conduct that violates a defendant's rights.
The effectiveness and fairness of the adversary system pre-
suppose that prosecutors behave fairly. The prosecutor is re-
93. Exhibit F, Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Ex parte Randall Dale
Adams, No. W-77-1286-I(B) (interoffice memorandum from Investigator Jeff Shaw to
Assistant District Attorney Douglas Mulder). See also Transcript, supra note 1, at 34.
94. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 50-66 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
97. See Jonakait, The Ethical Prosecutor's Misconduct, 23 CRIM. L. BULL. 550, 552
(1987). "At a crucial point in every investigation, therefore, the information gathering
shifts from an impartial inquiry as to who did it to the building of a case against a
specific person. What results is a natural tendency to acquire all the evidence that incul-
pates the person selected as guilty while all other evidence is ignored." Id.
98. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (prosecutor's "interest ... in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done .... He
may prosecute with earnestness and vigor - indeed, he should do so. But, while he may
strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain
from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every
legitimate means to bring about a just one."). See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-1.1(c) (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE] ("The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict.").
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quired, among other things, to reveal information that tends to
exculpate a defendant,°9 not to offer any evidence that the pros-
ecutor believes is fraudulent,"'0 to refrain from advocacy that
distorts the evidence, 101 and to refrain from improper argument
that encourages the jury to decide a case on matters unrelated to
the evidence. 102 In this case, these legal and ethical constraints
on the prosecutor's behavior were ignored.
Emily Miller, her husband, and Michael Randell were called
by the prosecutor at the end of the trial as "rebuttal witnesses,"
preventing the defense from having any chance to investigate
and contradict their stories. The strategy worked. Probably the
most powerful testimony at the trial came from Emily Miller,
waving her finger at Randall Adams and shouting, "that's the
man - I saw that man!' s0 3 The prejudicial impact of such tes-
timony on a jury is incalculable. 10 The jury during deliberations
focused heavily on Miller's identification, wanting to know
whether she gave a description to the police, and whether she
picked Adams out of a line-up.'
Too late for use at trial, the defense subsequently learned
that both Millers had reputations as liars, would do anything for
money, and were under arrest for other crimes at the time they
offered cooperation to the prosecutor. The jury was given the
false impression, apparently with the prosecutor's knowledge,
99. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963). See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE, supra note 98, at § 3-3.11(a) ("It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor inten-
tionally to fail to make disclosure to the defense, at the earliest feasible opportunity, of
the existence of evidence which tends to negate the guilt of the accused").
100. Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 7 (1967). See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
supra note 98, at § 3-5.6 ("It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor knowingly to
offer false evidence...").
101. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 736 (1969). See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE, supra note 98, at §§ 3-5.6, 3-5.7 (unprofessional conduct for prosecutor to offer
inadmissible evidence, ask legally objectionable questions, discredit a witness the prose-
cutor knows is telling the truth, or ask questions that imply facts prosecutor knows are
false).
102. Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 247-48 (1943). See STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 98, at § 3.5-8 (prosecutor should not use arguments calcu-
lated to inflame or mislead jury).
103. Transcript, supra note 1, at 25.
104. F. Lorrus, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 19 (1979). "[T]here is almost nothing more
convincing than a live human being who takes the stand, points a finger at the defend-
ant, and says, 'That's the one!'" Id.
105. See supra notes 53-54.
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that the Millers were gainfully employed and at work at the
time they made their critical observations. Also unknown to the
defense, but known to the prosecutor, was the Millers' interest
in reward money for information about the killing, as well as the
pendency of serious criminal charges against Emily Miller's
daughter, charges which the prosecutor dismissed in the same
courtroom one week after the Millers testified against Adams.'06
The context in which their claimed observations were
made - in the space of a few seconds late at night on a dark
street while driving in the opposite direction - by itself raises
considerable doubt about the accuracy of the Millers' identifica-
tions.10 7 The impeaching information, had it been known to the
defense, would have destroyed their credibility.
Moreover, the prosecutor plainly knew that the Millers were
untrustworthy and impeachable witnesses, but did not reveal
any of this information to the defense. The prosecutor, for ex-
ample, withheld a statement Emily Miller gave to the police
shortly after the killing, in which she described the killer as a
"Mexican or light skinned black man."'08 When the defense
learned about this statement for the first time on Monday morn-
ing following the Millers' Friday afternoon testimony, it sought
to recall Mrs. Miller. The prosecutor objected, arguing that
Miller had left Dallas and that the prosecutor did not know her
present whereabouts.' 0 9 The prosecutor's files, however, con-
tained receipts for numerous telephone calls made by the
Millers that Monday from a different hotel in Dallas." The
106. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
107. Courts and commentators have long recognized the treacherous nature of eye-
witness proof, and the potential breakdown in the adversary process resulting from mis-
taken identifications. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) "The vagaries of
eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with in-
stances of mistaken identification." Id. at 228. Eyewitness identification is felt to be "in-
herently suspect" and "notoriously unreliable." Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 350
(1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
A recent study of wrongful convictions concludes that the eyewitness misidentifica-
tion is the single most important factor leading to conviction. See Huff, Rattner &
Sagarin, Guilty Until Proved Innocent: Wrongful Conviction and Public Policy, 32
CRIME & DELINQUENCY 518, 524 (1986).
108. See supra note 54.
109. Adams v. State, 577 S.W.2d 717, 722-23 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). See also supra
note 53.
110. See supra note 53.
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prosecutor similarly knew, but did not disclose to the defense,
that neither Emily nor R. L. Miller was able to identify Adams
from a line-up, and identified him only after a police investiga-
tor pointed Adams out.11' In view of the devastating impact of
the Millers' in-court identifications, the prosecutor's suppression
of this information and his tacit vouching for the accuracy of
their testimony is astonishing, particularly when the defendant's
life hung on the acceptance of that testimony.
Distortion of proof is unethical and constitutes miscon-
duct.1"' Yet, the prosecutor skewed his presentation of the proof
to confuse the jury's perception of the facts. Although the prose-
cutor knew, for example, that the drive-in movie closed well
before midnight, which contradicted a crucial piece of Harris'
testimony, the prosecutor cross-examined the theater manager
in a deliberate effort to convey to the jury the false impression
that the theater may have remained open past midnight." 3 The
prosecutor knew that Michael Randell gave false and misleading
testimony about his background, where he was coming from, and
who he was with." 4 The prosecutor knew that Turko had been
hypnotized, and had made statements shortly after the shooting
directly contradicting her trial testimony.'" None of this infor-
mation, clearly relevant to discredit the trustworthiness of these
witnesses' accounts, was disclosed to the defense. Presupposing
highly skilled defense counsel able to test the accuracy and
truthfulness of the prosecution's proof - a basic postulate for
the adversary system's success' - the process necessarily
malfunctions when the prosecutor is able to distort the informa-
tion that enters the process, and screen out information that is
detrimental to his case.
111. See supra note 54.
112. See supra note 100.
113. See supra note 36.
114. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
116. See Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv.
228, 228 (1964) ("The plea for the adversary system is that it elicits a reasonable approx-
imation of the truth. The reasoning is that with each side on its mettle to present its own
case and to challenge its opponents, the relevant unprivileged evidence in the main
emerges in the ensuing clash."); Jonakait, supra note 97, at 566 ("When the prosecutor
presents distorted or incomplete evidence and the defense is unaware of the deficient
presentation, the adversary system is not fully functioning.").
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The prosecutor also withheld important evidence about
David Harris' credibility. Prosecutors commonly bargain with
accomplices and informants to convict other criminals. Although
these arrangements can be criticized on legal, policy, and ethical
grounds,117 the focus here is not on whether such practice in the
abstract is good or bad. The focus, rather, is on the ability of the
adversary system effectively to cope with this type of proof, es-
pecially when a prosecutor conceals crucial information about
the details of the arrangement. Harris indisputably received to-
tal and complete immunity for his testimony against Adams.
Harris, however, denied at trial that any deal had been made
with the prosecutor. Harris now acknowledges that the prosecu-
tor told him to deny that any deal was made if he were asked. 8
He admits that there was an understanding with the prosecutor
that if he testified consistently with what the prosecutor wanted
him to say, he would receive complete immunity for the many
charges he faced, which carried sentences of up to life imprison-
117. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22 (1967) (noting proclivity of accomplices
to lie in favor of prosecution). See Note, Accomplice Testimony Under Contingent Plea
Agreements, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 800 (1987). See also Use of Jailhouse Informers Re-
viewed in Los Angeles, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1989, at A14, col 1.
118. The district court found:
1.At trial, David Harris testified outside the presence of the jury that he had no
deals, agreements, promises, or offers of leniency in exchange for his testimony
(Trial R. IV-1114-16) nor would he get any help on the offenses committed in
Vidor either before or after the Wood murder (Trial R. IV-1119).
2.The burglary and aggravated robbery charges were not prosecuted and Harris'
juvenile probation was not revoked after he testified against applicant. In fact,
after applicant's trial, Harris never again had to report to his probation officer.
3.On the basis of conversations with the Dallas authorities, officer Sam Kittrell of
the Vidor Police Department had the understanding, prior to applicant's trial,
that Harris' charges would be dismissed after he testified against applicant.
4.Harris' family retained a lawyer, Rodney Price, to determine whether Harris
needed representation on the Vidor charges. After speaking to the authorities,
Price advised the family prior to applicant's trial that Harris did not need counsel
because the charges would not be prosecuted.
5.The charges were dismissed in consideration for Harris' testimony against
applicant.
6.The court cannot conclude definitively that the State made a deal with Harris in
exchange for his testimony against applicant. However, it does appear that Harris
lied when he testified at trial that he would not get any help on the Vidor charges.
7.The court cannot conclude definitively that the prosecutor had actual knowledge
that Harris' charges would be dismissed at the time Harris testified.
Ex parte Randall Dale Adams, No. W-77-1286-I(B) at 4-5 (Crim. Dist. Ct. No. 2 Dallas
County), aff'd, No. 70,787 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 1, 1989).
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ment. 119 As every prosecutor and defense lawyer knows, accurate
testimony about this type of immunity bargain is crucial to a
fact-finder's evaluation of a witness' credibility.12 ° A witness who
points the finger at someone else to protect his own life or free-
dom is arguably less believable for that reason. The Adams jury
never knew that Harris would go free in return for his testi-
mony, and would have been imprisoned, perhaps for the rest of
his life, if he did not testify against Adams in accordance with
the deal.
Compounding his misconduct, the prosecutor also resisted
defense efforts to elicit proof that Harris committed several ad-
ditional violent felonies after he returned to Vidor, which car-
ried a penalty of life imprisonment. The prosecutor argued that
such proof was irrelevant. 2 ' Judge Metcalfe concurred, and ex-
cluded this proof. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals upheld
Metcalfe's ruling. Nevertheless, a federal magistrate and a dis-
trict judge subsequently ruled that the prosecutor, Metcalfe, and
the Texas appeals court were wrong in keeping out that proof.1 2
Indeed, in a landmark case that was specifically cited to Judge
Metcalfe, the Supreme Court explicitly endorsed the admissibil-
ity of such proof. 123 Had the jury known the extent of Harris'
crimes and the extent of his self-interest in giving his testimony,
the jury might very well have discounted his testimony entirely.
Finally, the prosecutor's manipulation of "expert" testi-
mony produced the death sentence. Although the jury nominally
made the decision to execute Adams, the prosecutor and his psy-
chiatric witnesses, particularly Dr. Grigson, actually were re-
sponsible.'24 As Justice Blackmun wrote in one of several cases
reaching the Supreme Court involving the testimony of the
"ubiquitous"' 25 Dr. Grigson: "In a capital case, the specious tes-
119. Transcript, supra note 1, at 43. See also Ex parte Randall Dale Adams, No.
W-77-1286-I(B) at 4-5.
120. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17 (1974) ("Itlhe exposure of a witness'
motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally pro-
tected right of cross-examination").
121. Transcript, supra note 1, at 21.
122. Adams v. Lynaugh, Civ. No. CA 3-85-2448-G at 6 (N.D. Tex. filed May 13,
1988); Ex parte Randall Dale Adams, No. W-77-1286-I(B), at 4.
123. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. at 309.
124. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
125. Satterwhite v. Texas, 108 S. Ct. 1792, 1803 (1988) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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timony of a psychiatrist, colored in the eyes of an impressionable
jury by the inevitable untouchability of a medical specialist's
words, equates with death itself."' 26
Dr. Grigson examined Adams for about fifteen minutes. 2 '
Dr. Grigson testified that Adams had the profile and characteris-
tics of a sociopath and would commit criminal acts of violence in
the future that would constitute a continuing threat to soci-
ety.128 Although such predictions are notoriously unreliable in
general, 12 9 they appear grotesque when they concern a person
such as Randall Adams who never before in his life had engaged
in antisocial or violent behavior. This is particularly the case
when such testimony emanates from a witness - popularly
known as "Dr. Death" or "Dr. Doom" - who in virtually every
case testifies that the defendant is potentially dangerous and
should be executed. 3 0 Concerning witnesses like Grigson, Justice
Blackmun observed that these self-proclaimed experts at pre-
dicting future dangerousness create "an aura of scientific infalli-
bility,"'' making it difficult for the adversary process to "cut
through the facade of superior knowledge"'32 and thereby
demonstrate the fraudulent nature of such testimony.
See also supra note 68.
126. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 916 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
127. Transcript, supra note 1, at 32-33.
128. Adams v. State, 577 S.W.2d 717, 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
129. The American Psychiatric Association has characterized predictions of long-
term future violence as "fundamentally very low reliability." Brief Amicus Curiae for the
American Psychiatric Association at 12, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (No. 82-
6080). Other authorities, based on overwhelming evidence, have reached the same con-
clusion. See Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 920-21 and n.2. See also People v. Murtishaw, 29 Cal.
3d 733, 767, 631 P.2d 446, 466, 175 Cal. Rptr. 738, 758 (1981) (such predictions are "un-
reliable," "frequently erroneous," and "extremely prejudicial").
130. See Tybor, supra note 69, at 8. Cope, Predicting Future Violence, supra note
69, at 82. "Grigson has testified about defendants' potential for violence in 119 capital
cases, at times deeming defendants severe sociopaths certain to strike again. Only nine of
those defendants have been spared the sentence of death." Id. (footnote omitted). See
also J. WINSLADE & J. Ross, supra note 69 at 167 (Grigson has testified in virtually every
case that a capital defendant had been a sociopath).
131. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 926 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Giannelli, The
Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A Half-Century
Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1237 (1980)).
132. Id. at 932.
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III. The Truth: The Artist's Version or the Law's Version?
Art and law both claim to discover the truth. Law provides
an adversary trial process to accurately determine the facts. Art
also aspires to truth-finding, but is not hemmed in by eviden-
tiary rules and legal processes. Film, as a form of art, is freer
and more open to exploration and exposition. Law is objective,
and its language is spoken and written. Film is subjective, and
its language is visual, aural, and even tactile. Is either method
inherently superior? Is law's method seriously flawed? The Thin
Blue Line attempts to answer these questions. As an epistemo-
logical adventure story, the film forces us to examine our views
about the legal system's ability to uncover the truth.
Through free-flowing monologues of the principal players in
the case, the film critiques the basic precepts of law governing
our system's fact-finding process. Thus, under our legal system,
the police acquire evidence in a principled and nonarbitrary
manner; defense counsel is a skilled and forceful advocate; the
judge is neutral and detached; and the prosecutor serves justice.
Presumably all relevant nonprivileged information is available to
the fact-finder, such information is capable of testing through
cross-examination, and fundamental principles such as the pre-
sumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt guide the result. The film suggests, however,
that things are not what the public assumes they are. In the
Adams case these precepts were turned upside down, producing
a flawed result.
The first tenet of reliable fact finding is an efficient investi-
gation in which all relevant evidence is acquired and no relevant
proof is ignored.1 33 The homicide detectives violated this pre-
cept. They are portrayed as aggressive, overzealous, and simple-
minded. They become frustrated at failing to solve a cop-killing.
Rather than continuing to carefully investigate leads - and
there were several, most of which pointed to David
Harris - the police became desperate enough to settle for an
innocent man. Their selection of Randall Adams, at which time
the adversary system began to crumble, is portrayed as brain-
133. Y. KAMISAR, W. LA FAVE, J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 184-207 (6th
ed. 1986).
19891
37
PACE LAW REVIEW
less. The police believed Harris simply because he was a "nice
kid." They disbelieved Adams because he "protested his inno-
cence" and "didn't have a lot of remorse for what he had
done.' 134 The film even suggests that the police chose Adams
because Adams could be given the death penalty while Harris, as
a juvenile, could not. 5'
Another essential ingredient for reliable fact finding is an
able defense lawyer.' 36 The film's critique of Adams' attorneys
reflects two popular views of the defense lawyer. Under one
view, the lawyer is seen as a righteous, if necessarily ineffectual,
champion of the poor and the powerless, representing the forces
of good in the form of some socially just cause. This lawyer
stands resolutely against the forces of evil, characterized by pow-
erful government, a venal prosecutor, or an oppressive society. A
film such as To Kill a Mockingbird 37 captures this view. Under
another and by no means mutually exclusive view, the lawyer is
seen as a fighter, whose arena is the courtroom. Clarence Darrow
and Perry Mason come to mind, as do films such as Inherit the
Wind'38 and Compulsion.'3 9 Adams' lawyers fall into the first
category only. They are portrayed as honorable and decent peo-
ple, but naive, unaggressive, and easily manipulated. Edith
James says: "I admit, I'm sort of a gullible person. ' ' ""° Dennis
White says: "Since his trial I have . . . given up my practice of
criminal law .... I just feel like I'll let other people handle these
problems .... 141 Accurate fact finding, the film suggests, re-
quires at a minimum a defense attorney who is not only decent
and compassionate, as Adams' lawyers clearly were, but also ca-
pable of fighting, and maybe of dirty fighting, if necessary.
Adams' lawyers plainly were no match for Dallas County's ag-
gressive prosecutor.12
134. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
135. The Texas Penal Code states: "No person may, in any case, be punished by
death for an offense committed while he was younger than 17 years." TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 8.07(d) (Vernon 1989).
136. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963).
137. Universal 1963.
138. United Artists 1960.
139. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1959.
140. Transcript, supra note 1, at 17.
141. Id. at 40.
142. One of the grounds upon which the district court granted Adams' writ of
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Trustworthy results also require a disinterested judge who
can fairly and impartially run the show.143 Here, the judge was
biased and arrogant, unwilling and incapable of protecting
Adams' rights. The judge's sympathy for law enforcement is ob-
vious. To this man, judging a cop-killing case left little room for
objectivity, and considerable opportunity for emotion. The judge
characterized Adams as "only a drifter"1" and cried when the
prosecutor referred to "the thin blue line of police that separates
the public from anarchy. ' 145 The film poses the questions: Is this
the norm for judges? Did the judge do anything judicial here?
The popular myth about the prosecutor is that he is "Mr.
District Attorney," a "Champion of the People," a virtuous pro-
tector, and even a "Minister of Justice.'1 8 He or she has the job
of ensuring that justice is served and the defendant dealt with
fairly. We close our eyes to the possibility of a lawless official
who, entirely unnoticed, can subordinate the rights of citizens to
achieving personal victories. 1 7
The film suggests that the relationship between the prose-
cutor and justice is not what it seems. Allusions to the "Halls of
Justice" and the "Scales of Justice" become ironic metaphors for
the prosecutor's efforts to pervert the truth. Harris recalls the
prosecutor warning him to deny that an immunity deal had been
made."" Harris notes that Justice "has got that blindfold on. We
don't see what goes on behind the closed doors."'149 The prosecu-
tor "was deceiving the jury, see. He wanted to deceive Jus-
tice."1 150 Michael Randell later says: "That's why they call it the
Hall of Justice - the scales are not balanced. The scales are in
habeas corpus was the ineffectiveness of his counsel. The court found: "Counsel's con-
duct so undermined the proper function of the adversary process that the trial cannot be
relied on as having produced a just and reliable result." Ex Parte Randall Dale Adams,
No. W-77-1286-I(B) at 6 (Crim. Dist. Ct. No. 2 Dallas County), aff'd, No. 70-787 (Tex.
Crim. App. Mar. 1, 1989).
143. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 137 (1955); Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S.
466, 470 (1933).
144. Transcript, supra note 1, at 21.
145. Id. at 31.
146. Mayer, 'Hogan's Office' Is a Kind Of Ministry of Justice, N.Y. Times, July 23,
1967, § 6 (Magazine), at 7.
147. See supra notes 84-101 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
149. Transcript, supra note 1, at 42.
150. Id.
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the hall and they go up and down.... So if the D.A. wants you
to hang 15 or 20 years, you hung." '' The film scans a list of
defendants whom the prosecutor sent to the electric chair. There
is an air of unreality to their guilt or their death. We are re-
minded of the prosecutor's boast: "Any prosecutor can convict a
guilty man; it takes a great prosecutor to convict an innocent
man."' 15 The film makes this boast horribly real when we recog-
nize that a "great" prosecutor brought Adams within one week
of being executed. As a critique of capital punishment and of the
prosecutor's power of life and death, the film is brutal.
In addition to the integrity of the players, the system relies
heavily on rules of evidence supposedly geared to enhancing the
accuracy of verdicts. For example, the ability to show a witness'
interest or bias is essential to legal fact finding.'53 For Harris, his
interest was his freedom; for the Millers it was reward money
and the dropping of criminal charges against their daughter; for
Michael Randell it was covering up an embarrassing liaison.
While we see the effect this has on our view of the truth, so
clearly discrediting these witnesses' testimony, we learn that
none of this information was known to the jury. Cross-examina-
tion, the law's greatest truth-enhancing device, was entirely
worthless. If all this information remained hidden, the film asks,
did the legal system do its job?
Evidentiary rules also try to exclude unreliable proof, such
as the Millers' eyewitness identification of Adams.15 The Millers
testified that they picked Adams out of a line-up, but in the film
they admit that they did not. Their inconsistent statements
raise further doubts about the accuracy of their testimony. Most
damning of all, however, are the filmed monologues of the
Millers - a fascinating psychological portrait of vanity and ve-
nality. How could a jury ever accept their testimony? The film
suggests another question: How often does such proof support
an erroneous verdict?
Elaborating its thesis that things are not always what they
appear to be, that blue may be red, or that a judge may not be
151. Id. at 43.
152. Id. at 40.
153. See supra notes 116-122 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 103-111 and accompanying text.
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judicial, the film examines the "expert" psychiatric witness,
whose contribution to the fact-finding process is popularly
viewed as sacrosanct. The film's critique of Dr. Grigson turns
this view upside down.lsa Grigson is presented to a jury as an
expert on "future dangerousness." His testimony has resulted in
scores of defendants being sentenced to the electric chair. To
impressionable juries he is oracular and infallible. Grigson asks
Adams: "What is the meaning of a rolling stone gathers no
moss?' 156 Adams' answer seems normal, certainly in the main-
stream, something we would say. But Grigson says Adams
should die. Would Grigson diagnose us as sociopaths? Adams
had no prior record, and no. history of violence. Would Grigson
be able to send us to the electric chair? Is Grigson crazy? This is
the law, the film tells us. Upside down and inside out.
In the shadow of the electric chair, death chillingly pervades
the film, depriving us of the safety of our assumptions that the
law is capable of offering certainty and moral resolution.'57 In
fact, the law speaks not in certainties but in probabilities that
frequently end in morally and factually ambiguous results. The
film incites us to demand certainty when the result is death.
On a philosophical level, the film is a pictorial essay about
knowledge and truth. The film tells us truth is unknowable and
that what we "know" is merely our own version of the truth.
The point comes through when the title The Thin Blue Line
slowly changes from blue to red; it is vividly reinforced in the
Roshomon-like restagings of the murder, reminding us that we
cannot know what happened. The blurred outlines and changing
reality are constant reminders that there is no absolute truth.
Yet, by fusing together the cerebral and the sensual, the film
gives us a feeling about truth and falsehood that we have never
experienced before, certainly not from a novel, another film, or
an actual trial. The film suggests that it can do a better job of
ascertaining the truth by turning on the camera and the tape
recorder, and by reordering reality so that time and space move
155. See supra notes 124-132 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
157. This popular need for certainty may be one of the reasons the public finds plea
bargaining so morally offensive - it offers no morally acceptable resolution. In the
same way, the ambiguous resolutions of several recent highly publicized trials intensify
popular dissatisfaction with the law's inability to resolve disputes.
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in different ways than those on which we have learned to rely.
The free-flowing monologue reveals more than the law's custom-
ary question and answer style of interrogation, although it is
ironic that at the film's climax - the near-confession of David
Harris - the question and answer style is needed.
The film's own version of the truth is not perfect. Spatial
and temporal barriers are nonexistent. Cigarettes slowly accu-
mulate in an ashtray to convey the passage of time when Adams
is being interrogated. Wood's flashlight flies through the air in
slow motion to accentuate his violent death. The free-flowing
monologues are selectively edited, with more effective state-
ments retained and even juxtaposed with visual images bearing
no relation to the content of the statement. A good example is
Harris' statement "I just took off"'158 set against the restaging of
the death car accelerating away from the scene. From its con-
text, Harris' statement more logically referred to his "taking off"
from home. Banner headlines, used as chapter headings, are
meant to convey "objective" truth. The musical score is so pul-
sating and intense that it is impossible to believe that the film
would be effective without it.
In the end, although the film provides a version of the truth
superior to the official version, things are again not what they
seem. This is the final irony in a film filled with ironies. The film
"solves" the case. It satisfies the popular desire for certainty and
moral rightness. But while we are relieved that Adams has been
exonerated, we do not really know if he has been. We are sure he
is innocent, but will the law let him go? The film, as art, gives its
version of the truth. But the official version remains intact. The
film has convinced us that we know the better "truth" but that
it may make no difference.
IV. Conclusion
In documenting a Texas capital murder case, The Thin
Blue Line places the audience in the jury box and by providing
additional data, raises searing questions not only about the jus-
tice of the verdict, but also about the ability of the adversary
system to work when a prosecutor distorts and suppresses cru-
158. Transcript, supra note 1, at 44.
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cial facts. Having shown the fact-finding process as untrustwor-
thy, easily manipulated, and inadequate, the film presents the
artist's view of the truth, and becomes a visual meditation on
truth itself.
As this article was being completed, a district judge in
Texas recommended a new trial for Adams.1" That decision was
unanimously affirmed by the Texas Court of Criminal Ap-
peals.16 0 On March 21, 1989, after being incarcerated for twelve-
and-one-half years, Adams was released from jail. Two days
later, the Dallas District Attorney's Office announced that it
would not retry Adams because "it lacked sufficient credible evi-
dence against him. 1
61
159. On December 30, 1988, after an evidentiary hearing, District Judge Baraka
granted Adams' application for a writ of habeas corpus and recommended that Adams
receive a new trial. On January 5, 1989, pursuant to article 11.07 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure, the clerk of the district court certified the findings of fact and con-
clusions of law to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, which by law must review those
findings and conclusions. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Judge Baraka's
decision. Ex parte Randall Dale Adams, No. 70,787 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 1, 1989).
160. Id.
161. Belkin, Dallas Will Not Retry Man in Killing of Policeman, N. Y. Times, Mar.
24, 1989, at All, col. 1 (quoting Dallas District Attorney John Vance).
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